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Abstract
As data mining over massive amounts of linked data becomes more and more prevalent
in research applications, information privacy becomes a more important issue. This
is especially true in the biological and medical fields, where information sensitivity is
high. Previous experience has shown that simple anonymization techniques, such as
removing an individual’s name from a data set, are inadequate to fully protect the
data’s participants. While strong privacy guarantees have been studied for relational
databases, these are virtually non-existent for graph-structured linked data. This line
of research is important, however, since the aggregation of data across different web
sources may lead to privacy leaks. The ontological structure of linked data especially
aids these attacks on privacy.
The purpose of this thesis is two-fold. The first is to investigate differential privacy,
a strong privacy guarantee, and how to construct differentially-private mechanisms
for linked data. The second involves the design and implementation of the SPARQL
Privacy Insurance Module (SPIM). Using a combination of well-studied techniques,
such as authentication and access control, and the mechanisms developed to maintain
differential privacy over linked data, it attempts to limit privacy hazards for SPARQL
queries. By using these privacy-preservation techniques, data owners may be more
willing to share their data sets with other researchers without the fear that it will
be misused. Consequently, we can expect greater sharing of information, which will
foster collaboration and improve the types of data that researchers can have access
to.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lalana Kagal, Research Scientist at MIT CSAIL,
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Privacy preservation is the problem of assuring that information about individuals
that is available to agents will not be misused to harm those individuals. This is subtly
different than the problem of security, which attempts to deny agents from accessing
sensitive information. Both often go hand-in-hand in protecting individuals’ personal
data. However, while security is a relatively mature field, privacy preservation has
struggled to keep up. There are several reasons for this. One is that user privacy
is often an afterthought in system design, as developers are usually more focused on
achieving high performance than on protecting individuals. The second is that, in
legal terms, it is often hard to define and agree on what information misuse entails.
Finally, achieving privacy guarantees in systems is very difficult as there are few
ways to foresee and control how an agent who has access to personal data will use it.
Even worse, individual pieces of information from different sources, while not harmful
independently, can be damaging when combined correctly. A cunning adversary can
reconstruct an individual’s entire profile by using several sources. A consequence of
this phenomenon, known as Mosaic Theory [30], is that simple techniques such as
anonymization, the deletion of sensitive information from a data set, are not always
effective at protecting information. These privacy attacks have been observed in
practice in various case studies.
As data mining over user data becomes a more indelible aspect of modern in-
formation gathering, the importance of privacy becomes more essential. Individuals
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have grown wary of their information being used for research purposes, fearing that
their personal lives will be utilized in ways that they have not approved of. In par-
ticular, the public release of personal information may be socially embarrassing or,
even worse, financially and emotionally damaging. The Federal government has also
taken note and continues to impose regulations on how data may be shared and used.
This has negative consequences on the research community for whom the success of
a project depends greatly on whether or not individuals make their data available.
For biological and medical research, Federal laws also stipulate that certain privacy
conditions must be met, making information accessibility especially difficult.
Much of modern research into privacy deals either with implementing systems
that attempt to hinder adversaries from misusing information through access control,
accountability, and other techniques, or with finding ways to guarantee some measure
of privacy . The former line of research has the drawback of not offering any strong
privacy guarantees; the latter deals with developing mathematical models that do.
The most notable of these are the concepts of k-anonymity and differential privacy.
However, much of this research relates to the Relational Database (RDBMS) model.
In essence this is a tabular data format, where rows correspond to user data and
columns correspond to data labels.
Relational databases, while simple and highly-optimized, have several drawbacks
for use with web data. One drawback is that diverse labeling schema makes infor-
mation sharing cumbersome. For example, a set of databases may contain a column
corresponding to a person’s username, but each database labels it differently. As a
result, to share usernames across many databases requires manual field re-labeling.
In addition, any automated process attempting to use the database for reasoning will
need outside human aid to format the data for use.
In contrast, information on the web is becoming more and more decentralized. The
ultimate goal is the achievement of the Semantic Web [4], which will structure all web
data and have it be more easily manipulated by automated agents. Semantic web
technologies, such as Resource Description Framework (RDF) [16] and Web Ontology
Language (OWL) [19], were developed to ease information sharing on the web. These
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technologies provide meta-data in the form of ontologies and other labeling that
allows information from heterogeneous data sources to be shared easily. In particular,
these formats, known as linked data [25], make it far easier for automatons to share
and reason over data. This presents new privacy challenges, however, as the added
ontological structure enables adversaries to carry out privacy attacks on users more
easily. It is imperative that methods be developed to protect triplestores, the RDF
equivalent of databases.
This project focuses on maintaining privacy over standard SPARQL [31] end-
points, and attempts to provide a module that is flexible enough to provide privacy
preservation for various datasets. The system, named the SPARQL Privacy Insur-
ance Module (SPIM), is aimed to be used by SPARQL endpoint holders to provide
researchers with opportunities to mine semantic web data while preventing malicious
users from misusing it. It combines several techniques to achieve this. First, it uses
authentication to verify that an agent has permissions to use the system. Second,
it uses AIR [17], a semantic web policy language, to provide privacy policies that
control what information an agent will have access to and how this information is
displayed. Finally, and most importantly, it attempts to use differential privacy to
limit the damage that aggregate data can do to an individual. SPIM uses a form
of the principle of least privilege [34] for privacy. It limits information access to as
few users as possible, and confines the amount of damage any piece of information
released can do.
Because differential privacy has been mainly applied to relational databases, where
the data is highly structured, it is necessary to re-define is slightly for it to make sense
for graph-like data structures, which include linked data. As a result, a large portion
of this project is dedicated to looking at how to construct mechanisms over linked
data that are differentially-private. Apart from making sure that these are correct, it
is necessary to assure these are feasible to compute.
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1.1 Thesis Overview
The following outlines the contents of the thesis and the description of SPIM:
Chapter 2 will provide the relevant background necessary to describe the different
parts of SPIM. Specifically, it provides an overview of Semantic Web technologies
and how they differ from traditional databases, the problem of privacy preservation,
policy languages, and differential privacy.
Chapter 3 motivates the need for robust privacy systems for data mining over
linked data. It explores how this would be used in healthcare research, a field where
this would be extremely useful.
Chapter 4 will deal look at how differential privacy may be adapted to linked
data. It motivates how techniques used in classical databases will be modified, and
how this will theoretically affect the performance and accuracy of statistical queries.
Chapter 5 describes how SPIM was designed and implemented. It first looks at the
architecture, showing how the different parts of the systems collaborate for privacy
preservation. It then discusses the specific technologies used when implementing each
part of the system.
Chapter 6 has two main parts. It first looks at how the SPIM system is ap-
plied to the use-case discussed in Chapter 3. It then experimentally evaluates the
differentially-private mechanisms by looking at both their accuracy and runtimes.
Chapter 7 re-iterates the main points of the project. It looks again at the purpose
of the thesis and sees how well SPIM fulfills these requirements. It finally looks at
future directions for this work and areas where it can be improved.
16
Chapter 2
Background & Related Work
This section is meant to introduce the reader to the field of privacy in relation to
linked data. It first briefly discusses the Relational Database model (RDBMS) and
how Semantic Web technologies solve some of its limitations. Specifically, it compares
the two and describes why the latter is more appropriate for decentralized web data
exchange. Then, it gives a brief description of privacy and how it differs from more
mature fields such as data security and integrity. It further discusses the two main
ideas used to provide privacy over semantic web data. The first is policy languages,
which essentially provides a rule-based, fine-grained method for specifying how in-
formation should be accessed. The second is differential privacy, which gives strong
privacy guarantees on certain querying mechanisms. It also discusses other lines of
research relating to privacy preservation.
2.1 Relational Databases
The storage and manipulation of large amounts of digital data has been an important
field of research since the birth of computer science. Relational databases are a
form of data representation and storage that arose in 1970 [9] and has dominated
since. Mathematically, data is represented sets of tuples where each position in the
tuple represents a different attribute. These correspond to the tabular data structure
commonly used in statistics. A row, or record, in a table is a tuple and each column
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Table 2.1: Example of a Relational Database: People Profiles
id name email sex
1 Alice alice@example.com F
2 Bob bob@example.com M
Table 2.2: Example of Relational Database: Usernames
id username uri
1 alice89 http://example.com#Alice
2 bobcat http://example.com#Bob
is an index in the tuple. Data corresponding to an entity may be spread over several
such tables.
For example, consider Tables 2.1 and 2.2. These, respectively, correspond to two
sets of tuples:
(1, Alice, alice@example.com, F),
(2, Bob, bob@example.com, M)
and
(1, alice89, <http://example.com#Alice>),
(2, bobcat, <http://example.com#Bob>)
While this data format is simple and has been widely optimized over the years for
storage and querying, it is inadequate for use with more unstructured data. The main
drawback is that tables from varying data sources may be related, but must be joined
explicitly by a client to create this relation. This is because there is little meta-data
describing the tuples, making automated data linking difficult. In addition, tuples are
structured according to the attributes of a database. Sharing tables is more difficult
as a result because the different attributes must be matched explicitly. In an open
web where the amount of data is immense this is unfeasible.
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2.2 Resource Description Framework
The Resource Description Framework (RDF) [16] arose as a way to fix the limitations
of relational databases. RDF is an XML-based [23] data representation language.
Instead of keeping data in tuples, data is kept in triples. A triple consists of three
entities: a subject, a predicate, and an object. The subject and objects represent
pieces of information and the predicate represents some sort of relation between these.
All three are represented as Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI) or literals. A URI can
be thought of as an address to a webspace where some resource is located. Literals,
on the other hand, are pieces of data such as strings and numbers. RDF is often
simplified and written in Notation 3 (N3) [5], which contains the same structure but
with simplified namespaces.
@pref ix rd f : <http ://www.w3 . org /1999/02/22− rdf−syntax−ns#> .
@pre f ix f o a f : <http :// xmlns . com/ f o a f /0.1/> .
@pre f ix r d f s : <http ://www.w3 . org /2000/01/ rdf−schema#> .
@pre f ix : <http :// example . com/#> .
: Yotam a f o a f : Person ;
f o a f : name ”Yotam” ;
f o a f : knows [
a f o a f : Person ;
f o a f : name ”Fulan i to ”
] .
Listing 2.1: Sample FOAF File
Listing 2.1 shows an example FOAF [22] file, which is used for social networking. It
begins with namespaces, which define a prefix of the URIs. Namespaces are separated
from the name of the resource by a colon. For example, the term “foaf:Person” refers
to the class “〈http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1#Person〉” defined in the file at location
“〈http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1〉”. The same is true of the properties “foaf:name” and
“foaf:knows.” The file where these terms are defined is called an ontology. In this file
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are descriptions of these classes and properties, their meaning, and what kinds of rules
are associated with them. Resources without a prefix, such as “:Yotam”, are defined
to be objects defined in the current file located at webspace “http:/example.com/”.
Overall, the above file can be translated into English as follows: “There exists a
person named Yotam who knows another person named Fulanito.”
The benefit of having the file in the above format is that everything is presented
in the form of URIs and a shared ontology. This means that any online endpoint can
access this information by using the “foaf” namespace. In addition, any automaton
can refer to the “foaf” and other pre-defined ontologies to perform reasoning on the
data. This is more conducive to information sharing and decentralization.
2.3 Privacy
Privacy preservation is the problem of making sure information about individuals is
not leaked to the public or misused to possibly harm an individual. Privacy is different
from security in that the latter attempts to restrict access to information. In contrast,
when we talk about privacy it assumes that an agent will have access to some piece of
information but will not use it to harm others. Privacy can also work the other way;
an agent would like to obtain a piece of information without others knowing that it
was accessed. These are known as private information retrieval techniques [8]. This
project is more concerned with the former case.
One area in which privacy research is booming is in data mining. This refers to
the process of analyzing large sets of data to find useful trends. Data mining of-
ten involves carrying out statistical operations to be used with learning algorithms
that extrapolate patterns. Some simple examples include COUNT, which returns
the number of individuals with a certain property, and SUM, which sums a set of
numerical values. Sometimes data mining may require extracting non-aggregate in-
formation such as names, gender, birthdays, etc. However, revealing this information
indiscriminately would lead to privacy leaks and some access control is needed. In
addition, while it may seem that aggregate data is safe for public release, it has been
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shown that it may be cross-referenced with other data sources to identify individual
information with high probability. This is known as Mosaic Theory [30].
Any privacy system would therefore have to take care of at least two possible
concerns. The first is restricting the flow of information to approved users. The second
is assuring that the information will not be misused. For this project, these two are
mainly accomplished by use of policy languages and differential privacy, respectively.
2.4 AIR
Accountability in RDF (AIR) [17] is a rule-based policy language written in TURTLE,
a subset of N3 [3]. AIR Policies provide production rules, known as Linked Rules,
which may exist on different servers, and each policy is associated with an individual
Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). This gives AIR the ability to deal with policies
over heterogeneous data. The policy contains a set of rules which may be grouped
together or nested. The conditions of the rules are defined as graph patterns that are
matched against RDF graphs, similar to the Basic Graph Pattern (BGP) of SPARQL
queries.
An AIR file can have multiple policies, each of which may contain multiple rules
that check some set of conditions. For example, a policy can describe what kinds of
permissions a user will have. Consider the AIR policy in Listing 2.2, which has one
policy and one rule. It describes a policy which identifies if a user has the “Master
Email” required to view some private fields. It begins with a header describing the
namespaces used and the variables, :USER and :MBOX. Variables represent entities
that may be bound to resources or literals during reasoning. Then the policy “:Can-
ViewEverythingPolicy” begins. It uses one rule, “:HasMasterEmail.” This rule states
that if a user has an email that matches the “master email” then the user is compliant
with the policy. AIR also requires one or more log, or data, files which are reasoned
over. In this case, it would require a configuration file to see what the :MBOX is
and the user’s credentials, both which must be written in n3. A reasoner will check
the AIR file against the log files to see what policies the user is compliant with, and
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@pref ix : <http :// example . com/#> .
@pre f ix a i r : <http :// dig . c s a i l . mit . edu/TAMI/2007/amord/ a i r#> .
@pre f ix l og : <http ://www.w3 . org /2000/10/ swap/ log#>.
@pre f ix c on f i g : <http :// dig . c s a i l . mit . edu/ sp im onto l og i e s / c o n f i g f i l e#>.
@pre f ix f o a f : <http :// xmlns . com/ f o a f /0.1/#> .
@forAl l : :USER, :MASTERBOX, :MBOX.
: CanViewEverythingPolicy a a i r : Po l i cy ;
a i r : r u l e : HasMasterEmailPolicy .
: HasMasterEmailPolicy a a i r : Be l i e f−r u l e ;
a i r : i f { :USER f o a f :mbox :MBOX. :MASTERBOX con f i g : s e t t o :MBOX.}
a i r : then [ a i r : a s s e r t
{ :USER a i r : compliant−with : CanViewEverythingPolicy } ] ;
a i r : e l s e [ a i r : a s s e r t
{ :USER a i r : non−compliant−with : CanViewEverythingPolicy } ;
a i r : d e s c r i p t i o n ( :USER ‘ ‘ i s not the master user
and may not view s e l e c t e d f i e l d s ” ) . ]
Listing 2.2: Sample AIR Permissions Policy
decide what kinds of data he or she is allowed to view.
2.5 Differential Privacy
One of the objectives in modern privacy research is to create data mining algorithms
for which it can be proved that information cannot be used to fully identify an in-
dividual, meaning that their data cannot be leaked to malicious agents (also known
as the adversary). This is analogous to modern cryptography, where concepts such
as perfect secrecy [36] and semantic security [15] have corresponding secret-exchange
mechanisms which achieve them. One would hope that there would exist data mining
algorithms which provide perfect privacy or semantic privacy that would be useful.
“Perfect privacy” would ensure that an adversary with access to the database would be
unable to identify any individual’s information from the database. Similarly, “seman-
tic privacy” would ensure that this could not be done with non-negligible probability.
It turns out, however, that neither of these two concepts can be achieved while still
extracting useful information from the database [11].
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Differential privacy is a weaker requirement, and instead requires that whether
or not a user’s information is in a database will not affect an adversary’s ability to
identify his or her information. The common mathematical definition used when
dealing with relational databases is [11]:
Definition 1 A randomized function K gives -differential privacy if for all data sets
D1 and D2 differing on at most one record, and all S ⊆ Range(K),
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp()× Pr[K(D2) ∈ S]
The above property is usually achieved by the addition of probabilistic noise to
the result of a statistical query. The choice that is easiest to analyze is the addition
of Laplace noise. Let Q be a query, and let D1 and D2 be two data sets that defer by
a single record. The sensitivity of a query is given by the following definition:
Definition 2 For f : D → Rd, the L1-sensitivity of f is
∆f = maxD1,D2‖f(D1)− f(D2)‖
If the noise added is a random number generated from a Laplace distribution with
mean zero and variance ∆f

, then the aggregate query will be differentially private
[11]. The value of  will change depending on how low one wishes the probability
of a privacy leak to be. This in turn affects the accuracy of the results. In SQL,
a querying language for relational databases, function sensitivity depends on what
aggregate is being used. For example, the COUNT function on a single field in a
relational database will always have a sensitivity of one, since a difference of one item
in two databases yields at most a count of difference one.
Laplace noise addition makes working with statistical queries especially convenient
as it allows us to carry out multiple queries on a set. A set of n queries qi, each of
which is associated with an epsilon value i and has sensitivity one, is equivalent to
one query associated with  =
∑
i i and of sensitivity one [32]. Effectively this means
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that we can give a database a base budget , and deduct i from this budget every
time a query qi is run on the database.
Note that the -value applies to the entire data set. That means that, in theory,
only one user can make a single -valued differentially private query. This presents a
problem for implementation. If we wish several people to have access to a data set,
then it is required that the sum of their i-queries will be less than some pre-defined
. In Chapter 5 we will make some assumptions on the adversarial model that will
relax this restraint.
2.6 Related Work
Various techniques have been explored over the last decade for privacy preservation.
Anonymization, which is the process of sanitizing a database of all private information
before releasing it, is still a widely-used method, but is difficult to do correctly and
often requires specially-trained statisticians to carry out [26]. Even then, it provides
no strong privacy guarantees and is often vulnerable to information leaks.
Systems which use a strong privacy guarantee, on the other hand, require no
such cumbersome process and are flexible to many different data types. There are
several strong privacy guarantees that have been promoted other than differential
privacy. K-anonymity [37] is another popular privacy paradigm, and requires that
in any query result the data from at least k individuals are indistinguishable. While
this paradigm is worth researching, it requires that data be non-interactively altered
before querying takes place. For large amounts of data, this may be infeasible and
must be approximated [1]. In addition, k-anonymity is not a meaningful against all
adversaries [18].
Accountability [35] is a different form of privacy preservation. Data miners will
explicitly state what the information they are mining will be used for, and will be
held accountable, through either legal or informal means, if the data is used for other
purposes. While these techniques may form deterrents for data misuse, there are
several drawbacks. Namely, punitive measures will not completely do away with data
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misuse. In addition, parties must agree to abide by the privacy regulations, and
governmental institutions must agree to enforce them. This technique should be used
in conjunction with privacy-preservation systems such as SPIM to protect semantic
web data, but not exclusively.
Differential privacy has definitely been one of the most popular strong privacy
guarantees and has been widely explored both in theory and application. Most theo-
retical works look for ways to improve the efficiency of differential privacy by reducing
the amount of noise of the results. Techniques such as local sensitivity and smooth
sensitivity [29], may be extremely promising for big linked data. Other techniques,
such as the exponential mechanism [20], attempt to apply differential privacy to
non-aggregate data. Differential privacy is often associated with machine learning al-
gorithms, and how these perform under the addition of noise. An excellent summary
of all these topics is provided by Dwork [12].
Actual implementations of differential private systems are far fewer than theoret-
ical work. PINQ [21] is one of the earliest implementations, and has many interesting
features such as data partitioning, which allows for more exact queries. Airavat [32]
uses the Google MapReduce [10] framework, where differential privacy is carried out
through trusted mappers. A more recent design, PDDP [7], makes the assumption
that users own their own data, and applies differential privacy to aggregate data over
a distributed network. Airavat and PDDP are especially interesting lines of research
for the manipulation of big data networks. However, at this time the author has found
no differentially private system has been implemented for linked data. In addition,
the aforementioned implementations run for very specific platforms. This is good in
that they have more control over how data is manipulated, but has the drawback that
it is not applicable for all endpoints.
Privacy in linked data is a relatively unexplored field and one where research is
lacking. The added ontological structure, plus the goal that linked data endpoints will
consist of all web data, makes this format especially vulnerable to privacy leaks [28].
Some ways to deal with this include partial encryption of linked data, but these are not
complete solutions [28]. Another way is to provide privacy meta-data. For example,
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the Privacy Preference Ontology (PPO) [33] provides a description framework for
privacy preservation of linked data, and is used by the Hada system 1 to provide
user-controlled fine-grained access control. However, these are not strong guarantees.
In order for large distribution of linked data to move forward, more research into how
to guarantee individual privacy should be carried out.
1http://hprod.dyndns.org
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Chapter 3
Motivation: Privacy in Clinical
Information Data Mining
This chapter presents the motivation behind providing a privacy module for triple-
stores. We begin by presenting some real-world cases where privacy leaks have caused
financial and emotional damage. Some of the challenges of achieving privacy are also
presented and evaluated. We then present one specific scenario that deals with clin-
ical databases, where protecting patient information is not only legally required but
also extremely desirable due to the sensitive nature of the data. Finally, the overall
functionality of the desired solution is presented, along with any potential challenges
of dealing with privacy-enforcement technologies for triplestores.
3.1 Privacy in Data Mining
The question of privacy for large-scale information processing is becoming an impor-
tant aspect of modern academic research. Powerful computers may process billions of
data records relatively quickly. Using clever algorithms, it is possible to use them to
infer personal data from diverse information sources. As mentioned in the introduc-
tion, this concept is known as Mosaic Theory and has been shown to be applicable
in real-world scenarios.
The most infamous instance of Mosaic Theory in action is the Netflix Prize dataset.
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Netflix, an online movie rental and streaming service, released its user profile database
for its contest where it challenged hobbyist to develop a recommendation system.
All private fields, such as names, had been removed, so they believed no personal
information would be inferable. Most of what remained was statistical data relating
to users’ movie preferences. However, Narayanan and Shmatikov, two researchers
from the University of Texas at Austin, compared the database’s contents to other
information available online and found that many of the profiles could be re-identified
[27]. This led to a lawsuit against Netflix by its customers for disclosing their personal
details [6]. As a result, Netflix not only discontinued any future competitions but also
was damaged financially. Other famous examples include the AOL dataset breach [2]
and the GIC medical database breach [37].
As a result of this and other instances of privacy breaches, it has become increas-
ingly obvious to both businesses and individuals that privacy preservation is necessary
for public data sets. Information about individuals can be invaluable for decision-
making and collaboration, but privacy concerns deter businesses and other providers
from publicly releasing data. It is thus imperative to have privacy preservation a
central part of any data distribution system and not an afterthought.
3.1.1 Challenges
Privacy preservation is a difficult problem both theoretically and in practice. The
goal is to release information to the general public and to verify that private data
may not be identified and used to harm individuals. The difficulty lies in the fact that
an adversary will have access to data, but we have no guarantee how he or she will
use it. If we do nothing to protect individuals’ private data, an adversary will have no
hindrance to using it maliciously. On the other hand, the only solution for completely
protecting individuals is by not releasing their data at all [11]. This is clearly not
an acceptable answer. Hence, we must strike a balance between data usefulness and
individual privacy.
The simple solution of removing private information fields unfortunately does not
work, as shown by the above examples. In addition, removing and perturbing the
28
data fields can sometimes be time-consuming as it may require trained statisticians
[26]. We may also need to sanitize the original data into different versions depending
on who will be accessing the data. This means that it will be required to maintain
several different endpoints for the same data set. On the plus side, de-identification
still may deter potential privacy breaches. For example, if social security is removed
from a data set, then it can be assured that a social security, while still inferable using
other data sets, cannot be obtained from this one. Also, much of the data removal
can be automated, meaning that much of the de-identification can usually be done
quickly.
Differential privacy alleviates these problems with de-identification in several ways.
First, it is achieved via a mechanism, or an algorithm that does not depend on the
underlying data set. This means that the data itself does not have to be changed in
any way. More importantly, differential privacy is a strong privacy guarantee. Like
strong cryptographic methods, this means that we are sure that the mechanism works
with high probability if implemented correctly.
However, differential privacy, while nice theoretically, has problems in practice.
For one, differential privacy depends on perturbation, which in turn depends on the
query sensitivity. This means that very sensitive queries on data with high variance
are likely to give highly-noisy answers. Consequentially, it may be that the answers
will not be statistically useful if the number of data samples is not large enough or
is itself too noisy. In terms of implementation, calculating query sensitivity can be
inefficient, as it often requires multiple queries to ascertain the extremes of a query.
In addition, differential privacy techniques mainly deal with statistical queries. This
limits the types of queries that can be submitted. Finally, it is not always clear what
-value to set for the data in order to avoid privacy leaks.
Even from a theoretical standpoint differential privacy is not an omnipotent
panacea. Note the guarantee given: Whether or not an individual’s data is in a
data set will not greatly affect the probability that an adversary will discover his or
her personal information. In other words, a mechanism can still reveal information
to an adversary since it does not hide trends in the data. For example, consider an
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adversary that wishes to discover an employee’s salary. Suppose this adversary knows
that this employee’s salary is the average of all salaries in a data set in which every
employee has a salary of $40,000. If an adversary queried the average of the salaries
of this data set, he or she would get $40,000 since the sensitivity of the query is zero.
3.2 Case Study: Clinical Datasets
Clinical research is a field in which information privacy is paramount. There are
two general ways to conduct these types of investigations: clinical trials and observa-
tional studies. The former performs some experimentation on a selected subset of the
population to directly see effects of certain treatments or procedures. Observational
studies, on the other hand, attempt to look at past clinical trials or collected data on
some population to make some medical observation. For example, the observational
study from [24] looked at past cancer vaccine studies to see which cancer types have
been researched less, and what the overall effectiveness of these vaccines is. This type
of study is useful for planning new clinical trials.
Privacy in healthcare is of greater concern than in other applications, as peo-
ple may be more embarrassed about releasing their medical details. In addition,
medical conditions may result in discrimination, financial loss, or emotional trauma.
As a result, in most countries medical records are kept strictly private and remain
inaccessible to the public. In the United States, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is the set of rules regulating how to keep medical
records private and how to safely transfer them between medical providers. In addi-
tion, HIPAA defines how medical records may be released publicly 1. Eighteen types
of information must be removed from any public clinical database, such as names,
social security numbers, addresses, and biometric indicators. Another acceptable
method of de-identification is to use trained statisticians to perturb the data. [26]
While for most clinical research applications the process of de-identification is
acceptable, there may be cases where the elimination of this information will hide
1“Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (1996)” 5 USC § 552a
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important trends. Multiple versions of the data may be maintained, but adjusting
what fields are available for each application can be messy without fine-grained access
control. In addition, the information removed may not be enough to protect patient
privacy for the same reason that anonymization does not provide any strong privacy
guarantees. Instead, HIPAA relies on punitive methods such as accountability to in-
sure that breaches do not occur. A single successful attack, however, can be extremely
damaging. In addition, using the legal system can be costly and not time-efficient.
To make these problems more concrete, we will consider a clinical data set and
three different types of researchers that may want to access it. Suppose it is controlled
by the US Army and it pertains to army veteran patients that participated in combat
abroad and their ailments when they returned home. One user, Alice, is from the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). She makes public policy decisions
to attempt to curb the spread of diseases and epidemics. Bob is a doctor from the
Massachusetts General Hospital that wishes to study spread of foreign diseases in
different counties of Massachusetts. Finally, Charlie is an academic researcher from
MIT that wants to look at the pharmaceutical industry in the United States. Hence,
each user will require different permissions for data access. Alice, as a government
worker making public policy decisions, will require unhindered access to the data set,
even if it is not owned by the CDC. Bob will require access to some fields that are
covered by HIPAA, but not all. Charlie, which represents the majority of the user
population, should be able to use a database sanitized in accordance with HIPAA
and any military regulations. In addition, we cannot assume that these users are
completely honest. They may try to use this data to target individuals.
As discussed, a current solution might involve anonymization, whether through
directly releasing multiple databases or providing simple “access/deny” privacy poli-
cies. Each researcher will need to be given access to the database manually, leading
to problems in up-keeping the system. It would also employ statisticians to per-
turb sensitive data manually. Finally, accountability would be widely used because
these solutions provide no strong privacy guarantees. Thus, if a client misuses the
data then he or she may be prosecuted legally. This requires tracking the client’s
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activities, which may be costly.
A preferable solution is one that combines fine-grained access control, ease of
management, and strong privacy guarantees. As a demonstration of how this would
work, the US Army would maintain its linked data triplestore at some central location
accessible via an endpoint. David, the triplestore administrator, would configure the
system to deal with each type of user. Alice should have no bounds on her access.
In addition, David would like to minimally perturb the data so that she can have
extremely accurate query results. Bob requires the ability to filter based off specific
counties in Massachusetts. David, following the principle of least privilege, may want
to limit all other fields restricted by HIPAA and any others that the military considers
private, and in addition perturb the results greatly to assure Bob will have less of
an advantage if he is indeed malicious. Finally, Charlie should be given the least
amount of privileges, and his results should be perturbed so that if he is not honest
then information leaked cannot be used to target individuals.
Consider the query from Listing 3.1. It counts the number of veterans that
were deployed in Iraq for more than two years, are currently living in Boston, and
were prescribed Doxycycline. If Alice were to send this query she should get the exact
number of veterans that fit this description. Bob would be allowed to make this query
and get a numerical result, but it should be guaranteed that the result could not be
used to reveal information about a single soldier. Finally, Charlie should not be able
to send this query. According to HIPAA, a patient’s current city of residence cannot
be made public. Therefore, Charlie should get an error message and no meaningful
numerical result.
As mentioned, this system is built with the aim of promoting information sharing.
While each data point may have its own standards for querying, we would like to be
able to support as many operations as possible. To this end, SPARQL 1.1 will be
used as the standard. Doing this on a simple, general platform will demonstrate its
applicability to diverse linked data query platforms.
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PREFIX AMD: <http ://www. army . gov/army database#>
PREFIX MED: <http ://www. army . gov/army med data#>
SELECT (COUNT(? s ) as ? num so ld i e r s ) WHERE
{? s AMD: persona l ID ? id ;
AMD: deployed ‘ ‘IRAQ” ;
AMD: length deployment ?o ;
AMD: c u r r e n t c i t y ‘ ‘ Boston ” .
MED: ho sp i t a l e v en t :E .
:E MED: event type MED: p r e s c r i p t i o n ;
MED: p r e s c r i b ed ‘ ‘ Doxycycl ine ” .
FILTER{?o > 2}
}
Listing 3.1: Sample Query
3.3 Design Challenges
While the above steps are theoretically sufficient for protecting individuals with high
probability, there are two additional main concerns (apart from those already men-
tioned) that one needs to consider. The first challenge is balancing access control
with perturbation. Which data should be completely off-access, which should be re-
leased with noise or some strong privacy guarantees, and which should be completely
accessible? This is something that may differ for each data set type. For example,
HIPAA stipulates what data is off-access to the public. However, it may be the case
that some data sets, by nature of the data in them, may require more stringent access
controls. Any privacy system must decide how to balance this.
While we wish to make this system as flexible as possible so as to allow it to be
used with many endpoints, there will still be limits to how all-encompassing it can
be. Arbitrary linked data, because of its unstructured, graph-like composition, makes
identifying privacy risks very difficult. Namely, one must ask what kinds of data are
considered private. How do we identify which resources are associated with a certain
person? In a tabular structure, this is much easier. If one record corresponds to
a single person, then every attribute corresponds to that person. In linked data, a
resource may be shared between not only people but also different entities. As such,
we need a reliable way to identify what data and resources belong to a person before
we attempt to protect them.
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These and more concerns will be addressed in the next two chapters, which will
consider not only how differential privacy applies to linked data but also how to
implement one possible solution to the above scenario.
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Chapter 4
Differential Privacy for the RDF
Data Format
The last section stressed the need to provide strong privacy guarantees for statistical
queries. As mentioned in the introduction, this project opted to use differential
privacy. The first reason why is because, though it is a relatively recent idea, there is
a great amount of research in the subject. Second, it has been showed to be effective
for use with statistical analysis and machine learning, two technologies which have
greatly spurred the development of the Semantic web. Third, it is enforced via a
mechanism, which means that the process for achieving it is data-independent. This
means the data itself does not need to be modified to achieve privacy.
Also as mentioned in the background, differential privacy has mainly been explored
for the relational database model. This chapter will explore this definition with
respect to linked data structures. It further explores whether or not the same methods
used are appropriate when dealing with RDF triples. The main results of this section
are (1) the differential privacy guarantee for RDBMS can be achieved for linked data;
(2) that roughly the same techniques may be used for both to achieve differential
privacy; and (3) the exploration of derivative differential privacy definitions for linked
data.
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4.1 Generalized Differential Privacy
The difficulty with applying differential privacy to linked data is the fact that all
differential privacy, including the definition, has been tailored for use with RDBMS.
In particular, this comes from the common definition of differential privacy, which
states that two data sets should differ by one record. What does this mean from a
linked data perspective if there are no records? There are several possibilities, and
later these will be discussed. For all of these to make practical sense and keep the
essence of differential privacy, however, they all require two data sets to differ by the
inclusion or exclusion of one unit in that data set.
In order to begin the discussion, we will need a more generalized form of differ-
ential privacy. To formalize the idea of two data sets differing by one individual, we
introduce a distance function d that measures how two different two sets of data D
and D′ are. We will use this distance function in the definition. In addition, as per
many other formal cryptographic definitions, we introduce the formal concept of an
adversary. An adversary A is a randomized algorithm T that computes some function
TA and produces some transcript t, or output.
With these concepts, the generalized differential privacy definition, as roughly
presented in [13], is
Definition 3 Consider data sets from some domain D. A mechanism is -indistinguishable
if for all pairs x, x′ ∈ D such that d(x, x′) = 1, and for all adversaries A, and for all
transcripts t:
|ln( Pr[TA(x) = t]
Pr[TA(x′) = t]
)| ≤  (4.1)
Basically, this asserts that an adversary is very likely to produce the same tran-
script on very similar data sets. Note that this definition reduces to the original one
for RDBMS. In that case, the distance between two data sets is the number of records
that are different between these two sets.
With this new definition, and in particular with the inclusion of the generalized
metric, it will be easier to develop a formalization of -indistinguishability for linked
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data.
4.2 Translating Linked Data to Records
First we consider the most natural choice for defining linked data over RDF graphs.
Because the record is the atom of relational databases, we consider the atomic unit
of graphs, the triple. In this case, differential privacy would be defined over two
graphs that differ by a single triple. This fits in nicely with a lot of the theory
developed for record-based differential privacy. For example, many of the function
sensitivities are similar. The sensitivity of COUNT is 1, as for a query on two data
sets differing by a single triple at most one extra triple may be counted. On the other
hand, this definition would not achieve our desired objective of protecting the entirety
of an individual’s data. In fact, using this metric gives us the following guarantee:
Regardless of whether or not a user provides a single triple in the database will not
affect whether or not an adversary is able to identify that triple with high probability.
While this is better than nothing, it is far weaker than what is desired.
Instead, it would be better if the guarantee would be more in-line with the “record”
definition. To that end, we need to see what corresponds to the removal of a “personal
record” from an RDF graph. When a record is removed from a relational database, a
tuple corresponding to a primary key is deleted. In RDF, a person is identified by his
or her URI, and so we can imagine this serving as the role of the primary key. The
rdf properties would serve as the names for fields. Thus, a triple (?x ?y ?z) would
correspond to the record of person “?x” in column “?y” with value “?z”.
We need to be slightly more careful with linked data though. Consider the fol-
lowing graph:
:P a foaf:Person;
foaf:knows "Alice";
foaf:knows "Bob".
In a record, each attribute is a one-to-one. On the other hand, in linked data it is
possible to have one-to-many attributes. In the above, “foaf:knows” maps “:P” to two
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Table 4.1: RDF Graph Reduced to Records
Person Knows Knows Loves
P1 P2 Null P4
P3 P2 P4 Null
items. As such, we will instead use a more generalized version of records for linked
data, where a person’s URI is the primary key and each attribute can be one-to-many.
Proposition 4 Let two RDF graphs G1, G2 have distance d(G1, G2) = 1 if the graphs
are equal everywhere but at one node n in G2 which has had all its outgoing edges
removed. This corresponds to having one “record” removed from G2.
The construction of these generalized records is relatively simple. It involves
reducing the two graphs to a generalized tabular format where attributes may be
repeated and showing they are equal everywhere except on one row.
First, we assume there exists a value NULL such that for a RDF triple (?x ?y NULL)
indicates that element ?x has no relationship ?y with another node. This is required
since RDF data does not always require a relationship between two nodes to be
present. We also know that the RDF graph is finite. Let EG be the set of RDF
properties in the graph G, and let |Eg| = p. Map each element e ∈ EG to some
integer i in {1, 2, ...p}.
We now define a function TG : G×E → G∪ {NULL}. For every pair (x, y) such
that x ∈ G, y ∈ E, we let TG(x, y) = z if there exists a triple (x y z) in the RDF
graph. If no such triple exists for the pair, then the value is NULL. This function
defines a table where nodes are rows and edges are columns. As an example, figure
4-1 shows a sample graph and Table 4.1 shows what the reduction looks like.
Now, suppose the edges are removed from node n. The row corresponding to edge
n now consists fully of null values. In essence, this row contains no information. Then
T ′G : G−{n}×E → G, which is the same everywhere to TG except for the node n, is
equivalent to TG. Therefore, removing the outgoing edges from a node corresponds
to removing a record from a table.
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Figure 4-1: Sample RDF Graph to Reduce to Table
How does this definition translate into a real-world linked data set? In essence, it
states that whether or not a user explicitly links his or her URI to other resources and
literals the chances of a privacy breach remain about the same. This is essentially the
same guarantee given for relational databases. It is especially convenient because it
makes no assumptions on the underlying graph structure and ontology. This means
that, theoretically speaking, the added ontological structure imposed on the data
will not make a difference under the -privacy mechanism. This does not mean that
the added ontological does not present a greater privacy risk, but that whether or
not an individual links his or her data does not affect an adversary’s probability of
successfully identifying him or her.
4.2.1 Calculating Data Sensitivity
The sensitivities of the standard SPARQL statistical operations (COUNT, SUM,
AVG, MIN, MAX) used to guarantee -privacy do not match the RDBMS ones. For
example, suppose we send the following SPARQL query on the graph from figure 4-1:
SELECT (Count(?o) as ?count) WHERE {?s foaf:knows ?o}
The sensitivity of this query should be 2, as removing all the triples relating to
person “P3” will change the number of triples counted from 3 to 1. One of the main
problems for linked data is in knowing which resource “belongs” to a person. We will
assume for now that there is an algorithm to do this. That is, for a linked data graph
S and for every person p, there is a way to find subset Sp ⊆ S such that each triple
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x ⊆ Sp belongs to person p. Sp therefore includes all triples (p, x, y) for some x, y.
In this way, we know that two data sets differ by a single “record” if one is S and the
other is S − Sp. Note that all the subsets {Spi} do not have to be disjoint
The following are the sensitivities for the five functions COUNT, SUM, AVG,
MIN, and MAX, assuming we have figured out Sp already. These are some of the
most useful aggregate functions from SPARQL.
• COUNT: Let C be a query that counts the incidence of a matching triple in
a linked data graph. Then the sensitivity of C is Maxp|C(S) − C(S − Sp)| =
MaxpC(Sp), i.e. the maximum number of triples matched belonging to person
p.
• SUM: Let U be a query that sums the numerical values of a variable for triples
matching a certain graph pattern. Then the sensitivity of U is Maxp|U(s) −
U(S − Sp)| = Maxp|U(Sp)|, or the maximum of the sum of the triples matched
belonging to person p.
• AVG: Let A be a query that computes the average of the numerical values of a
variable for triples matching a certain graph pattern. Then the sensitivity of F
is:
NOISY AV G = Maxp|
∑
j∈S xj
Countj∈S(xj)
−
∑
j∈S−Sp xj
Countj∈S−Sp(xj)
|
For every set of triples Sp belonging to a person p, we take the difference of
the average with Sp and without Sp. It turns out that it is necessary to try
out every person to get the exact sensitivity for average. To limit information
transfer, an approximation is used. We rely on the following fact: To maximize
NOISY AVG either the rightmost term is maximized or it is minimized.
Let C be the COUNT function, and let MC = MaxpC(S − Sp) (as defined
for COUNT above) and mC = MinpC(S − Sp). In addition, let U be the
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SUM function and MU = MaxpU(S − Sp) (as defined for SUM above) and
mU = MinpU(S − Sp). In other words, we are looking for the minimum and
maximum values of COUNT and SUM when user “records” are removed. Then
we can approximate the sensitivity as
Max(|A(S)− mC
MU
|, |AV G(S)− MC
mU
|)
To calculate AVG then, we only need to retrieve seven values: AVG(D), COUNT(D),
SUM(D), max(SUM(SP )), min(SUM(SP )), max(COUNT(SP )), and min(COUNT(SP )).
While these are still many terms, it is definitely an improvement over trying to
remove all triples belonging to a person p.
• MAX: Let F be the query that finds the maximum of numerical values of a
variable for triples matching a certain graph pattern. Then the sensitivity of F
is Maxp|F (S) − F (Sp)| = Maxp|F (Sp)|, or the maximum values of all triples
matched to person p.
• MIN: Let H be the query that finds the minimum of numerical values of a
variable for triples matching a certain graph pattern. Then the sensitivity of
H is Maxp|H(S) −H(Sp)| = Maxp|H(Sp)|, or the maximum of the minimum
values of all triples matched to person p.
These are the standards functions for SPARQL 1.1. How these calculations are
implemented will be further discussed in the next chapter. In particular, we did not
figure out how Sp is computed, which is extremely important. In addition, these
calculations may break down in edge cases.
4.2.2 Variants of the Differential Privacy requirement
Because of the restrictions of the above definition, it may be worthwhile to consider
other definitions for differential privacy and see if these would provide better guar-
antees. On one hand, we could relax the requirements and see if these will be easier
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to implement while still providing meaningful, practical privacy guarantees. We have
already looked at the idea of using the triple as the unit for distance, but this does
not provide the guarantee we desire. It seems, in fact, that using any smaller unit
than the “personal record” will not give a strong-enough guarantee for protecting the
individual. These types of guarantees, however, are not completely worthless, as they
do give us some bounds on the power of the adversary. As mentioned, for example,
using the triple as the unit of difference will make a single piece of information much
less likely to be discovered by an adversary. The other benefit to using a smaller unit
is that the complexity of calculating function sensitivities may go down. In addition,
it may decrease the amount of noise used, which will give more accurate results. For
the triple, for example, COUNT always has a sensitivity of one. This means that
adding the noise should take constant time, which is far better than having to per-
form an extra query. It would definitely be worthwhile to see if a weaker unit than the
“record” would provide results that are acceptably robust against privacy attacks.
On the other hand, it may be worthwhile to use a more restrictive definition. For
example, one idea is to provide a mechanism that insures privacy regardless of whether
or not a person exists on the web space. In other words, regardless of whether or not
a person exists in the linked data set his or her data is secure against privacy leaks.
This is different from the “record” definition because this also includes sensitive data
which other people have linked to the person. While this scenario is ideal, it is not
clear how one would go about precisely defining a distance function to achieve this
definition. In addition, this guarantee may be so strong that the perturbation renders
results worthless. In other words, too strong of a guarantee might make the function
sensitivities too extreme.
42
Chapter 5
System Architecture and
Implementation
This chapter discusses the architecture of the SPARQL Privacy Insurance Module
(SPIM). Chapter 3 described the requirements of our system: A general privacy
framework to protect statistical queries over linked data. It should have ways to
differentiate between different clients with different access rights and privacy limits.
It should also provide some strong privacy guarantees. We will use the theory and
equations developed in the last chapter to achieve this.
The first section presents the different parts of the system and how they collaborate
to secure user information from malicious use. In addition, it considers the design
assumptions, choices, and trade-offs made. The second section talks about the actual
technologies used to implement the system. It will also describe some of the minor
scripts built to get the different components to function in unison.
5.1 Architecture
Figure 5-1 shows the main components of SPIM. At a high level, SPIM needs to be
able to perform the following functions. First, it must log users into the system and
verify their credentials. Next, it must be able to use the user’s credentials to give them
different permissions for data access. Finally, it needs to enforce strong privacy guar-
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Figure 5-1: Architecture of the Full SPIM Server
antees. These are achieved via three integral parts of the system: authentication, the
privacy policy enforcement, and the differential privacy mechanism. In general, each
component is implemented independently of one another, but all these must share
information among each other to function correctly. For example, the authentication
module may need to send credentials to the privacy policy enforcement component.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the system design follows that of least privilege.
Users must present their credentials, and the system uses fine-grained access control
to determine what data he or she may access. All incoming queries are checked against
privacy policies to determine if they violate the user’s privileges. The complementary
goal is to make sure that any data that is released will be useful while still limited
in the amount of damage it can do. Thus, statistics are released via a mechanism
that upholds differential privacy. At the same time, user-friendliness is an important
aspect. The user should have an easy time logging on to the system and using the
querying framework. The system should give users the knowledge of why a query
is non-compliant with a privacy policy instead of just denying access. Finally, the
returned noisy statistics should still be useful. The user-friendliness should ideally
apply server-side as well. An administrator should be able to plug in the module to
an existing SPARQL endpoint without too much effort.
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5.1.1 Authentication
The purpose of authentication is to extract a user’s credentials to decide what per-
missions he or she is given. Optionally, it is possible for the system to automatically
create a user profile if it does not exist. Several fields of information are vital: name,
email, etc. These are used by a privacy policy enforcement script.
5.1.2 Privacy policies
Privacy policies are AIR policies that enforce the data-viewing permissions allotted to
the users. The privacy policy files consist of one or more policies, each containing one
or more rules. These may be compared against the user’s credentials, permissions,
and the actual query to decide whether a privacy hazard exists or not. To do this,
both the credentials and the query must be in N3 format and so must be explicitly
translated.
Consider the AIR file in Listing 5.1, an example privacy policy file for a clinical
triplestore. This privacy policy, “:HIPAAPolicy,” contains a rule “:NamesRetrieve-
dRule” which stipulates that names cannot be retrieved unless they are being returned
as a COUNT aggregate as per the HIPAA regulations. This is only part of the full
HIPAA policy which would have to be written, which includes more identifiers such
as biometrics, age, social security numbers, etc. Note that here there are three rules.
The first rule, “NamedUsedRule,” checks that the inputted log file is a SPARQL
query, and that this query looks for names. The second rule looks to see if the name
is actually retrieved. If it is, then the third rule makes sure that it is only retrieved in
aggregate format. The rules here are chained together, meaning that one rule is only
considered if another rule finds a matched pattern. This makes it possible to create
very flexible policies.
Suppose the SPARQL query from Listing 5.2 is sent to the endpoint. It will be
translated into the n3 code from Listing 5.3. The translation is relatively un-detailed.
That is, the data is either in the form of variables retrieved or variables in triple
patterns. This makes the privacy policies easier to write, and also applicable to any
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@pref ix : <http :// dig . c s a i l . mit . edu/TAMI/2007/ cwmrete/nonce#> .
@pre f ix a i r : <http :// dig . c s a i l . mit . edu/TAMI/2007/amord/ a i r#> .
@pre f ix s : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/ sp im onto l og i e s / sparq l2n3 onto logy#> .
@pre f ix l og : <http ://www.w3 . org /2000/10/ swap/ log#>.
@forAl l :QUERY, :CLAUSE, :TRIPLE, : SUBJ, :RETRIEVE, :TRIPLE2 ,
:OBJ, :NAME, :NAMECOUNT.
: HIPAAPolicy a a i r : Po l i cy ; a i r : r u l e : NameUsedRule .
: NameUsedRule a a i r : Be l i e f−r u l e ;
a i r : i f { :QUERY a s : SPARQLQuery ; a s : s e l e c t q u e r y ; s : c l au s e :CLAUSE.
:CLAUSE s : t r i p l ePa t t e r n :TRIPLE.
:TRIPLE log : i n c l ud e s { :SUBJ <https : // med data . com#patient name> :NAME} .
} ;
a i r : then [ a i r : r u l e : NameRetrievedRule ;
a i r : d e s c r i p t i o n ( :QUERY ‘ ‘ uses pat ient name in the where c l au s e ”) ] .
: NameRetrievedRule a a i r : Be l i e f−r u l e ;
a i r : i f { :QUERY s : r e t r i e v e :RETRIEVE. :RETRIEVE s : var :NAME. } ;
a i r : then [ a i r : a s s e r t { :QUERY a i r : non−compliant−with : HIPAAPolicy } ;
a i r : d e s c r i p t i o n ( :QUERY ‘ ‘ t r i e s to r e t r i e v e pa t i en t names d i r e c t l y which
i s i l l e g a l . They may only be r e t r i e v e d in aggregate format ” ) ] ;
a i r : e l s e [ a i r : r u l e : NameCountRule ] .
: NameCountRule a a i r : Be l i e f−r u l e ;
a i r : i f { :RETRIEVE s : var :NAMECOUNT.
:CLAUSE s : t r i p l ePa t t e r n :TRIPLE2 .
:TRIPLE2 log : i n c l ud e s { :NAMECOUNT s : bound as [ s : op count :NAME ] } . } ;
a i r : then [ a i r : a s s e r t { :Q a i r : compliant−with : HIPAAPolicy } ;
a i r : d e s c r i p t i o n ( :QUERY ‘ ‘ uses pa t i en t names f o r counting ,
which i s a l lowed ” ) ] ;
a i r : e l s e [ a i r : a s s e r t { :QUERY a i r : non−compliant−with : HIPAAPolicy } ; ] .
Listing 5.1: Sample AIR Privacy Policy
modified version of SPARQL 1.1 where extra keywords are included.
The AIR policy reasoner, which enforces the privacy policy, will catch that the
client is searching for patient names, which is not allowed unless they are being
counted (i.e. retrieved in aggregate format), and the query will ultimately be rejected.
The client will get back an error stating this fact explicitly (instead of a vague denial
of access). This will be the computation tree from the policy file as well as the
description: “Query uses patient names directly which is illegal. They may only be
retrieved in aggregate format.” The researcher can now choose whether to re-write
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SELECT ?n (SUM(? o ) as ? p i l l s consumed )
WHERE {
?p med dat : pat ient name ?n .
?p med dat : p r e s c r i b ed ?k .
?k med dat : mi l l i g rams ?o .}
Listing 5.2: Query Sent
@pref ix s : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/ sp im onto l og i e s / sparq l2n3 onto logy#>.
@pre f ix : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/spim/ query in n3#>.
: Query161 a s : SPARQLQuery ;
a s : s e l e c t q u e r y ;
s : r e t r i e v e [
s : var : n ;
s : var : p i l l s consumed ;
] ;
s : c l au s e [
s : t r i p l ePa t t e r n { : p i l l s consumed s : bound as [ s : op sum : o ] } ;
s : t r i p l ePa t t e r n { : p <https : // med data . com#patient name> : n } ;
s : t r i p l ePa t t e r n { : p <https : // med data . com#presc r ibed> : k } ;
s : t r i p l ePa t t e r n { : k <https : // med data . com#mil l igrams> : o } ;
] .
Listing 5.3: Query Translation to N3
the query to be compliant with the privacy policy or to move on to another query.
Using these policies allows an administrator to greatly customize what the client can
and can’t do and what kinds of results he or she gets.
5.1.3 Differential Privacy
The mechanism that enforces differential privacy is an independent set of functions
within SPIM. The implementation of this mechanism follows from Chapter 4. These
functions are not required for SPIM to work as differential privacy is optional and
can be disabled if desired. The reason that the differential privacy enforcement was
embedded into the SPIM class was to ease the communication between these functions
and the SPARQL endpoint. This was done very early in the project, and decoupling
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SELECT ?p (SUM(? o ) as ? p i l l s consumed )
WHERE {
?p med dat : pat ient name ?n .
?p med dat : p r e s c r i b ed ?k .
?k med dat : mi l l i g rams ?o .}
GROUP BY ?p ORDER BY DESC(? o )
Listing 5.4: Sample Query for Sensitivity Calculation
did not seem necessary. However, in future iterations is should be possible to decouple
these two scripts if desired.
The sensitivity calculation is carried out as described using the formulas in Chap-
ter 4. This involves sending extra queries to the triplestore to extract the necessary
extreme values of the matching triples.
Recall that we need to be able to identify data belonging to a certain individual.
To do this, we assume that the URIs pertaining to individuals can be identified by
the existence of a certain triple with a certain predicate. This can be, for example,
a triple identifying the person’s name; any URI associated with a “foaf:name” can
be assumed to belong to an individual. This allows us to group the contributing
elements of a final statistical result by user. The user with the highest contribution
to the final answer defines the query’s sensitivity, and this value can be used when
calculating the noise.
For example, to calculate the sensitivity of the query in Listing 5.2 it is necessary
to find the user who was prescribed the most milligrams of some medicine. This is the
maximum sum of medicine administered by user. The same WHERE clause is used
to write a query to extract this value. The same triples are matched, but the values
are instead grouped by each individual and ordered greatest to least. This allows us
to easily find the extreme value (which is the first result) easily. Listing 5.4 shows
this second query.
Note that the assumption made about all personal URIs being tagged identically
is not safe for general data sets. That is, not every URI corresponding to a person may
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Figure 5-2: Implementation Overview
have a “foaf:name” or anything similar. This means that SPIM needs some structure
on the data, which is not true for general linked data. This will be discussed further
in Chapter 7.
5.2 Implementation
SPIM has two main parts to its implementation. The first is the actual SPIM mod-
ule, which handles the privacy policies and handling the differential privacy guarantee.
The second is the HTTP server on which the module runs. This part of the implemen-
tation handles the authentication and serving the querying interface. These are both
implemented in Python, and the latter is implemented as a Django server. Figure 5-2
shows an overview of the implemented components.
The Django server, which handles the user interface and the authentication, is
described in the first section. The second section describes the SPIM module. It
is divided into three parts. The first describes how AIR is implemented, including
the query translation into N3. The second is how the calculation of the differential
privacy is carried out. Finally, we describe how triplestores are used to store user
information and how we interface with the main triplestore.
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Figure 5-3: A screenshot of the user interface associated with the Django Spim-
Module
5.2.1 Django Server
SPIM is imbedded into a Django module (called Spim-Module), which in turn runs on
a Django server charged with handling the HTTP requests. The server also contains a
separate authentication module that performs authentication via OpenID 1 , though
it is possible to use any authentication mechanism. OpenID was chosen because of
the ease of user maintenance and because it fits better with decentralized information
sharing. The module contains the scripts to generate the web interface. In addition,
it interfaces with the SPIM class to do the privacy preservation. When a user sends a
query it is sent to SPIM, which in turn performs the querying. In essence, this means
that the SPIM module can be ported to any other HTTP server and used similarly.
1This open-source Django module was implemented by Simon Willison, and can be found at
https://github.com/simonw/django-openid
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5.2.2 AIR Implementation
The AIR privacy policy files are parsed and reasoned over using cwmrete. This script
is an implementation of the rete [14] algorithm, a forward chainer for pattern matching
in production rule systems. The reasoner uses the policy files written in AIR and log
files written in n3. As mentioned, the incoming queries that are reasoned over must be
translated into n3 as a pre-processing step which was described above using Listing
5.2 and Listing 5.3. This is done using an independent python script. First, the
query is parsed by Rasqal2, a C library that is used for SPARQL manipulation. This
pre-parsed output is then read by a translator, which makes triples specifying the
variables retrieved, the clauses in the where pattern, and any functions used.
The AIR reasoner compares the query to the policy files to make sure no unautho-
rized data fields are accessed. If there is an unauthorized access attempt, the reasoner
returns an error along with the reasoning behind the denial of access. This allows the
user to know why the query was non-compliant with the query.
5.2.3 Result Perturbation
Chapters 2 and 4 described much of the theory behind differential privacy, and the
last section described the additional structural assumptions that had to be made on
the linked data in order for the sensitivity calculation to work using SPARQL. These
can be almost directly translated into an implementation.
In Chapter 2 we mentioned that a single -budget had to be assigned to an entire
triplestore. We will relax this restrained and assume that each user can be assigned
his or her own -budget. This will affect the adversarial model, which will be discussed
in the next chapter. Alternatively, it is possible to assign a single -value to an entire
triplestore by changing a few lines of code in SPIM.
The mechanism that guarantees differential privacy works as follows. A user sends
a query and a desired -value to be used from his or her budget. SPIM will check
that the budget would not be exceeded by performing this query. If not, it first sends
2http://librdf.org/rasqal/
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one or more queries to find the sensitivity of the user’s query. When the function
sensitivity has been calculated, the query itself is forwarded to the triplestore. The
sensitivity and -value is used to calculate the appropriate noise to the result, which
is then returned to the user. Finally, the -value used is deducted from the overall
budget.
There is one edge case that had to be considered. If a set of triples is matched for
only one person, then the sensitivity of the functions AVG, MIN, and MAX return no
answer. To handle these cases, the sensitivity is simply returned as the values of the
query on those triples. This sensitivity is large enough because it is the same as the
sensitivity if two sets of triples were matched: that of the person and another person
who contributes nothing to the final answer.
For queries where no triples are matched, on the other hand, the query will return
a null set or zero. As a result, this edge case must also be handled. In this case,
though, it’s easy to see that the sensitivity is irrelevant as no statistical result is
returned.
5.2.4 Interfacing with the Triplestores
There are two triplestores that are important to the functionality of SPIM. The first
is the actual triplestore being protected. The second is the one used by SPIM to keep
track of users and their  values. 4Store3 was used as the triplestore implementation to
store the both the test and user data. A generic interface was built for communicating
with triplestores, and a concrete interface was built for communicating with the 4store
triplestores. It relies on the python library built specifically for 4store, HTTP4Store4.
Any type of triplestore may be used, however, so long as the interface is extended to
deal with its API.
3http://4store.org/
4http://pypi.python.org/pypi/HTTP4Store/
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Chapter 6
System Evaluation
SPIM has two main criteria that must be tested: correctness and complexity. The
former has two additional subdivisions. The first is that the implemented noise-
addition mechanism imposes differential privacy. The second is that all the different
components function correctly to provide privacy under an actual use scenario.
The first section will be more qualitative, and describe in detail how the use case
from Chapter 3 could be implemented using SPIM. The second section deals with the
accuracy of the differential privacy enforcement mechanism. The final section briefly
considers the runtime.
6.1 Revisiting the Use Case
Here we consider how well the system could handle the use case given in Chapter 3.
Recall the design specifications. What was desired was a privacy system that can man-
age private, decentralized information sharing for clinical research purposes. There
are several types of users that might require this data set; three examples were given.
The first (Alice) is a government worker in the CDC that needs almost un-hindered
access to the data set. The second (Bob) is a doctor that needs geographically-filtered
clinical data. He needs the ability to look at patients from different counties in a state.
The third (Charlie) is an academic researcher that should have limited access to most
private information. To prevent attacks from non-honest parties, we also wished to
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provide some strong privacy guarantees. We will also assume that these users do not
collude and have only one OpenID account, as this will allow us to assign each his or
her own -budget for use for maintaining differential privacy.
We will examine each individual’s interaction with the system. We start with
Charlie’s, which is the “default” user type, and look at Alice’s and Bob’s after. The
final section addresses the security concerns that would need to be dealt with in order
for this to be deployed in a real-world system.
6.1.1 Charlie’s interaction
Charlie is the “default” profile, so SPIM has been customized to create his user profile
automatically. To use SPIM, Charlie logs in with his OpenID and is allocated an -
budget (which is 0.5 by default, though this can be easily changed). Charlie will then
send his query to SPIM. The system will first check his query against the default
privacy policy, which will consist of the rules for information sharing in HIPAA. If
Charlie attempts to explicitly retrieve private data then his query will be rejected.
If the privacy check passes, then SPIM assures that Charlie has enough remaining
-budget to carry out the query. If he does not then an error is returned. If he does,
then the query is forwarded to the endpoint, and the appropriate Laplace noise is
added to the query result. The perturbed answer is returned to the client, and the
-budget is updated.
6.1.2 Alice’s interaction
Alice must have an administrator manually create her a user profile. The adminis-
trator must also set that no access control must be associated with her. In addition,
he will set her budget as “-1.0.” This will indicate to the system that Alice must not
have her queries perturbed via the addition of Laplace noise (since the budget can
never become negative in the case where results are perturbed).
Alice uses her OpenID to log into the SPIM, and it pulls up her user profile.
When Alice sends her query to SPIM, it verifies that no checks and no perturbation
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are necessary. Thus, it forwards the query to the triplestore and returns the results
to her.
6.1.3 Bob’s interaction
Bob would also need to have an administrator create his profile manually. While he
can be given a default value for his -budget, it must be specified in his privacy policy
that he has access to patient addresses. This necessitates that the administrator write
Bob an individual AIR policy (though this may be simplified by reusing linked rules).
Bob would log into the system and his profile retrieved from the userProfiles
triplestore. When he sends a query, it is checked against the privacy policy. So
long as his query does not retrieve private information (except for perhaps address
information), the query is forwarded to the endpoint and the result is perturbed (as
in Charlie’s case).
6.1.4 Where the design is limited
The above cases demonstrate that SPIM can handle several diverse cases where users
may have different privacy privileges. The principle of least privilege still applies.
For example, Bob is given access to as little private data fields as possible. It serves
as a demo for how a privacy module could be constructed for linked data and how
differentially-private mechanisms can be implemented.
As described above, however, SPIM is not wholly immune to attacks. The two
assumptions were that (a) adversaries do not collude and (b) users cannot use multiple
OpenIDs. As such, SPIM may perform poorly against determined adversaries. There
are some fixes that would make the system far more robust. As mentioned in the last
chapter, one could apply a single -budget value to the entire triplestore. This would
require changing a few lines of code in SPIM, and would make collusion attacks more
difficult. However, this severely limits the number of queries all clients can make,
and the data may not be very useful. A solution to this, which is implemented in
PINQ [21], is to partition the data into relatively random subsets, such that each
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subset has its own budget.
Another solution is to combine accountability methods with SPIM. Users would
commit to not sharing any query results with the world. This too would prevent
collusion attacks. However, accountability methods would only deter collusion attacks
and not prevent them outright.
Finally, security concerns were not considered in the design of this system. SPIM
is not guaranteed to withstand any malicious adversaries that attempt to break any of
the mechanisms, and only ensures that if the system works properly then differential
privacy is guaranteed over the data in the triplestore. It also has no way of preventing
identity-theft attacks. This would definitely need to be addressed for a stable SPIM
implementation.
6.2 Testing Differential Privacy
One of the main objectives of this project was to explore whether applying differentially-
private query mechanisms for linked data was possible. To test this it is necessary
to see if the function sensitivities can be accurately calculated for different queries.
As a result, the correct amount of Laplace noise can be added, and by the theorems
from Chapter 2 this will guarantee differential privacy.
6.2.1 Data used
This project used a subset of the MIMIC II clinical database1 as test data. More
specifically, the data relates to events where fluids and medicine were administered to
the patient, as the presence of numerical data made it more amenable to statistical
queries. Only the data relating to one hundred patients was used, yielding a total of
126,660 triples. This data, which was originally in tabular format, was translated to
RDF using a python script. In addition, and ontology was defined for the data, and
fake names, addresses, and social security numbers were associated with each patient.
1http://physionet.org/mimic2/
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@pref ix : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/spim#>
@pref ix mimic : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/ sp im onto l og i e s /mimicOntology#>
@pref ix f o a f : <http :// xmlns . com/ f o a f /0.1#>
: Pat i en t 3 mimic : event : E 0 .
: E 0 mimic :m1 ‘ ‘ P e n i c i l l i n ”
mimic : time ‘ ‘2999−01−05 19:59:23−0400”;
mimic : v1 ‘ ‘2000”ˆˆ< http ://www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#decimal >;
mimic : u1 ‘ ‘Uhr ” ;
mimic :m2 ‘ ‘XYZ” ;
mimic : v2 ‘ ‘399.0”ˆˆ< http ://www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#decimal >;
mimic : u2 ‘ ‘ml ” ;
mimic : r t ‘ ‘ IV Drip ” .
: Pat i en t 3 f o a f : name ‘ ‘Morgan Michaels ” ;
f o a f : s sn ‘ ‘000−00−0000”;
mimic : l i v e s I n ‘ ‘USA” ;
mimic : r eg i on ‘ ‘MA” ;
mimic : town ‘ ‘ Cambridge ” ;
mimic : z ip ‘ ‘ 02139” .
Listing 6.1: Sample Clinical Data
6.2.2 Test Queries
The testing consisted of nine separate queries for SUM,AV G,MIN, and MAX, and
ten separate queries for COUNT . These consisted of different WHERE clauses so as
to yield different theoretical noise values. The testing suite consists of first finding the
actual query sensitivity, then finding the calculated sensitivity, and finally calculating
the absolute error (calculated - actual). To find the former, the query is transformed
wherefore all triples belonging to a certain person are removed. More specifically,
the MINUS keyword was used. Listing 6.2 shows such a query in Python. String
formatting is used to cycle through the names, testing the result when discarding all
triples associated with a certain “foaf:name.” The actual sensitivity is the resulting
maximum difference between the original query and every query with some set of
triples removed.
For a list of all test queries used, please refer to appendix A.
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‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘PREFIX rd f : <http ://www.w3 . org /1999/02/22− rdf−syntax−ns#>
PREFIX rd f s : <http ://www.w3 . org /2000/01/ rdf−schema#>
PREFIX f o a f : <http :// xmlns . com/ f o a f /0.1#>
PREFIX mimic : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/ sp im onto l og i e s /mimicOntology#>
SELECT (%s (? o ) as ? aggr ) WHERE{
? s f o a f : name ?n .
? s mimic : event ? e .
? e mimic :m1 ‘ ‘ I n s u l i n ” .
? e mimic : v1 ?o .
FILTER( isNumeric (? o ) )
MINUS {? s f o a f : name ‘ ‘% s ”}
}
””” % ( operat ion , names [ i ] )
Listing 6.2: Sample Query for Actual Sensitivity Calculation
6.2.3 Noise Results
Figure 6-1 shows the actual noise from the Test Query 4 [A.4]. We will only consider
this example to explore some interesting trends present in all the queries’ results.
Some of the operations, such as MAX and AVG, seem to have rather low noise. MIN,
in fact, usually has no noise associated with it for this data set. On the other hand,
the COUNT and SUM operations seem to have very high sensitivity, which implies
that a large amount of noise must be added to the result.
Figure 6-2 shows the resulting absolute error from two separate test queries. The
most noticeable feature is that for the functions COUNT, SUM, MIN, and MAX the
exact sensitivity calculation was possible. This is excellent, especially for COUNT
and SUM where the sensitivities are already quite large. The calculation of AVG was
not exact, but the absolute error is not too high and should yield acceptable noise
levels. Moreover, it seems that the noise calculated is always greater than the actual
noise.
Are these good noise levels? That is debatable. For some operations, such as
SUM, the sensitivity is generally quite large. Even for a small amount of noise, far
more data samples are required to get comparable statistical analysis to noise-less
data [38]. This means that a very large number of data samples would likely be
necessary to get good results. On the other hand, for some operations, such as AVG,
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Figure 6-1: Sensitivities calculated and measured for Test Query 4
the sensitivity is relatively small and would perhaps work well for statistical analysis.
In the future, it would be worthwhile to actually test these noise levels with some
statistical analysis algorithm and measuring its performance.
For a list of full results, please refer to appendix B.
6.2.4 Runtime Results
Figure 6-3 show the runtime results for test query 4. The important feature to note is
that the complexity of calculating the sensitivity for most operations is on the order of
running the query. This is because most of the sensitivities are calculated by sending
one additional query to the endpoint. The glaring exception is AVG, which requires
multiple separate queries to get all the values. Right now, because this process is not
optimized, five separate queries are sent to get the AVG, SUM, and COUNT values
for the users. It should be possible to combine these queries to look for multiple
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Figure 6-2: Absolute error for sensitivity calculation for Test Query 4
values per query since these all share the same WHERE clause and only differ by
whether or not the results are grouped by patients.
While a slowdown by two or three factors may be fine for relatively small data
sets, it may not be acceptable for large ones where query times are much longer.
One nice property, however, is that the calculation of the sensitivity and the actual
query may be done in parallel. A combination of parallelization, query-merging, and
efficient sublinear approximation algorithms may be useful if runtime is an issue.
A full list of runtime results are also located in Appendix B
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Figure 6-3: Graph showing runtimes for Test Query 4
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusion
Protection of individuals’ private data for decentralized information exchange has
become extremely important in today’s technological endeavors. Failure to do so
can damage both these individuals and the companies and institutions that rely on
the availability of data to make accurate decisions. Experience has shown that sim-
ple techniques such as anonymization and de-identification do not always provide
adequate privacy. More sophisticated techniques, such as access control and strong
privacy guarantees, must be used.
The goal of this project was to bring these strong guarantees into the realm of
linked web data. This was done by both showing and evaluating ways in which these
guarantees can be upheld, and by demonstrating a system whose components work to
hinder privacy attacks on triplestores. The thesis began by presenting the technologies
associated with the semantic web, why they were relevant for information sharing,
and the ideas behind differential privacy for relational databases. Next, examples
were presented to motivate real-world examples where privacy protection could have
prevented emotional and financial damage, and a use case was presented to motivate
what qualities a privacy-preservation system should have. The next two chapters dealt
both with the theoretical and practical issues of developing such a privacy system on
linked data. Finally, the system was evaluated in its correctness and complexity, and
some of its strengths and weaknesses were pointed out.
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7.1 Contributions
There were four main contributions from this project.
• Translating the differential privacy requirement for relational databases
to linked data and developing the mechanisms that guarantee differentially-
private SPARQL queries.
The main goal of this project was to see if it is possible to apply differential
privacy to linked data. As most of the relevant research and mechanisms de-
veloped for differential privacy assumed a relational database, it was necessary
to develop an equivalent definition for RDF. Because of the unstructured na-
ture of linked data, it was necessary to change the way we look at two data
sets differing by a unit. As a result, the concept of triples belonging to a user
was developed, and it was applied to calculating function sensitivities for use in
differentially-private data release mechanisms.
• Developing practical mechanisms that enforce differential privacy on
linked data.
The above model was demonstrated to work in practice via its application to
SPARQL queries. A series of functions were written that insured the differential
privacy requirement over linked data. It was possible to calculate the function
sensitivities for several important SPARQL 1.1 aggregate functions (COUNT,
SUM, AVG, MIN, and MAX) using relatively simple code. It was also demon-
strated that these calculated function sensitivities were highly accurate, and
could be computed relatively quickly. This supports the potential of differential
privacy research for linked data in the future.
• Implementing a module for privacy-aware SPARQL queries.
It was important to demonstrate how a mechanism that guarantees differential
privacy would fit into a real-world privacy-preservation module. To that end,
the SPARQL Privacy Insurance Module was designed and implemented. It com-
bined differential privacy with other known effective techniques, such as privacy
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policies and authentication, to verify that user information in a SPARQL end-
point would be kept private. By looking at a motivating use case of clinical
research, SPIM was tailored to deal with various users with different privacy
regulations. The authentication and privacy policies can thus regulate what
data a client has access to, and the differential privacy functions can assure
that the statistics returned cannot be used maliciously with high probability.
While SPIM is not secure enough to be deployed in the real world as it has not
been thoroughly tested against real-world adversaries, it can serve as a model
for how privacy techniques can be used in unison to protect individuals.
• Creating tools to apply AIR policies for SPARQL 1.1 queries.
Past research in the Decentralized Information Group dealt with applying AIR
privacy policies to SPARQL queries. However, these functionalities were out-
dated and irrelevant for working with aggregate query functions. As a result,
much of this software had to be re-implemented to be used for this project.
Namely, a new script was written to translate SPARQL 1.1 queries to n3, and
the ontology to describe this translation had to be updated.
7.2 Future Work
SPIM was a preliminary work with regards to using strong privacy guarantees for
linked data. While it demonstrated that these indeed do have a place on the open
web, there are many areas that need to be further explored in order to fully use these.
• While this thesis evaluates the techniques developed in terms of correctness,
it remains to be seen how effective these are in practice. Specifically, on real
semantic web data it may be the case that the data variance is too high and
that differentially private mechanisms introduce too much noise in data to be
useful. Consequentially, it may be necessary to refine the model developed here
for use on real-world data. This is especially true because web data is constantly
changing, so using non-approximate techniques is inadequate.
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• A significant assumption was made when developing the differentially private
mechanisms: Private data must be easily identifiable. Unfortunately, the simple
“tagging” mechanism may not be sufficient for unstructured linked data. It
would be worthwhile to develop better techniques that more accurately identify
subsets of an RDF graph that are considered private.
• Only a small subset of query functions was considered when developing the
differentially private mechanisms. More research would be necessary to expand
these techniques for general functions.
• It may be the case that differential privacy is not the optimal strong privacy
guarantee for linked data, especially since it deals mainly with statistical queries.
Perhaps other strong privacy guarantees should be explored as these may be
more appropriate.
Finally, as mentioned previously, SPIM would need to be further refined before
it could be deployed in a real-world setting. Any future SPIM-like implementations
would need to further consider how to optimally design the system so that it is both
secure against attacks while still useful. To that end, more sophisticated schemas
are needed to manage the users, their permissions, and the privacy budgets they
are given. In this project many assumptions about the adversaries were made to
increase usability. A better implementation would look for ways to do away with
these assumptions while still making sure that users can perform as many queries as
possible.
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Appendix A
Test Queries
The following are the queries used in testing. Note that any place where there is a
“%s” should be replaced by COUNT, SUM, AVG, MIN, or MAX. All five of these
operations were tested per query (except for in Test Query 1).
Query 1 tests COUNT on non-numeric data. Queries 2-6 test numerical data (in
the form of medication administered). Test 7 tests behavior when only one person’s
triples are matched. Test 8 tests behavior when no triples are matched. Query 9 and
10 test sensitivity calculations when more than one numerical value is retrieved. Note
query 9 and query 7 have the same WHERE pattern.
PREFIX rd f : <http ://www.w3 . org /1999/02/22− rdf−syntax−ns#>
PREFIX rd f s : <http ://www.w3 . org /2000/01/ rdf−schema#>
PREFIX f o a f : <http :// xmlns . com/ f o a f /0.1#>
PREFIX mimic : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/ sp im onto l og i e s /mimicOntology#>
SELECT (%s (? e ) as ? aggr ) WHERE{
? s f o a f : name ?n .
? s mimic : event ? e .
}
Listing A.1: Test Query 1
PREFIX rd f : <http ://www.w3 . org /1999/02/22− rdf−syntax−ns#>
PREFIX rd f s : <http ://www.w3 . org /2000/01/ rdf−schema#>
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PREFIX f o a f : <http :// xmlns . com/ f o a f /0.1#>
PREFIX mimic : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/ sp im onto l og i e s /mimicOntology#>
SELECT (%s (? o ) as ? aggr ) WHERE{
? s f o a f : name ?n .
? s mimic : event ? e .
? e mimic :m1 ‘ ‘ I n s u l i n ” .
? e mimic : v1 ?o .
FILTER( isNumeric (? o ) )
}
Listing A.2: Test Query 2
PREFIX rd f : <http ://www.w3 . org /1999/02/22− rdf−syntax−ns#>
PREFIX rd f s : <http ://www.w3 . org /2000/01/ rdf−schema#>
PREFIX f o a f : <http :// xmlns . com/ f o a f /0.1#>
PREFIX mimic : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/ sp im onto l og i e s /mimicOntology#>
SELECT (%s (? o ) as ? aggr ) WHERE{
? s f o a f : name ?n .
? s mimic : event ? e .
? e mimic :m1 ‘ ‘ I n s u l i n ” .
? e mimic : v1 ?o .
? s mimic : z ip ‘ ‘ 02139” .
FILTER( isNumeric (? o ) )
}
Listing A.3: Test Query 3
PREFIX rd f : <http ://www.w3 . org /1999/02/22− rdf−syntax−ns#>
PREFIX rd f s : <http ://www.w3 . org /2000/01/ rdf−schema#>
PREFIX f o a f : <http :// xmlns . com/ f o a f /0.1#>
PREFIX mimic : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/ sp im onto l og i e s /mimicOntology#>
SELECT (%s (? o ) as ? aggr ) WHERE{
? s f o a f : name ?n .
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? s mimic : event ? e .
? e mimic :m1 ‘ ‘ I n s u l i n ” .
? e mimic : v1 ?o .
FILTER( isNumeric (? o ) ) .
FILTER(? o > 1)
}
Listing A.4: Test Query 4
PREFIX rd f : <http ://www.w3 . org /1999/02/22− rdf−syntax−ns#>
PREFIX rd f s : <http ://www.w3 . org /2000/01/ rdf−schema#>
PREFIX f o a f : <http :// xmlns . com/ f o a f /0.1#>
PREFIX mimic : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/ sp im onto l og i e s /mimicOntology#>
SELECT (%s (? o ) as ? aggr ) WHERE{
? s f o a f : name ?n .
? s mimic : event ? e .
? e mimic :m1 ?m.
? e mimic : v1 ?o .
? e mimic :m2 ?m2.
? e mimic : v2 ?o2 .
FILTER( isNumeric (? o ) ) .
FILTER(? o > 1)
}
Listing A.5: Test Query 5
PREFIX rd f : <http ://www.w3 . org /1999/02/22− rdf−syntax−ns#>
PREFIX rd f s : <http ://www.w3 . org /2000/01/ rdf−schema#>
PREFIX f o a f : <http :// xmlns . com/ f o a f /0.1#>
PREFIX mimic : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/ sp im onto l og i e s /mimicOntology#>
SELECT (%s (? o ) as ? aggr ) WHERE{
? s f o a f : name ?n .
? s mimic : event ? e .
? e mimic : time ? t .
69
? e mimic : u1 ?u1 .
? e mimic : u2 ?u2 .
? e mimic : r t ? r t .
? e mimic :m1 ?m.
? e mimic : v1 ?o .
? e mimic :m2 ?m2.
FILTER( isNumeric (? o2 ) && isNumeric (? o ) ) .
}
Listing A.6: Test Query 6
PREFIX rd f : <http ://www.w3 . org /1999/02/22− rdf−syntax−ns#>
PREFIX rd f s : <http ://www.w3 . org /2000/01/ rdf−schema#>
PREFIX f o a f : <http :// xmlns . com/ f o a f /0.1#>
PREFIX mimic : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/ sp im onto l og i e s /mimicOntology#>
SELECT (%s (? o ) as ? aggr ) WHERE{
? s f o a f : name ?n .
? s mimic : event ? e .
? e mimic : time ‘ ‘2682−09−12 20 : 00 : 00 −0500”.
? e mimic : v1 ?o .
FILTER( isNumeric (? o ) ) .
}
Listing A.7: Test Query 7
PREFIX rd f : <http ://www.w3 . org /1999/02/22− rdf−syntax−ns#>
PREFIX rd f s : <http ://www.w3 . org /2000/01/ rdf−schema#>
PREFIX f o a f : <http :// xmlns . com/ f o a f /0.1#>
PREFIX mimic : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/ sp im onto l og i e s /mimicOntology#>
SELECT (%s (? o ) as ? aggr ) WHERE{
? s f o a f : name ?n .
? s mimic : event ? e .
? e mimic : time ‘ ‘FAKE TIME” .
? e mimic : v1 ?o .
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FILTER( isNumeric (? o ) ) .
}
Listing A.8: Test Query 8
PREFIX rd f : <http ://www.w3 . org /1999/02/22− rdf−syntax−ns#>
PREFIX rd f s : <http ://www.w3 . org /2000/01/ rdf−schema#>
PREFIX f o a f : <http :// xmlns . com/ f o a f /0.1#>
PREFIX mimic : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/ sp im onto l og i e s /mimicOntology#>
SELECT (%s (? o ) as ? aggr ) (COUNT(? o2 ) as ? other ) WHERE{
? s f o a f : name ?n .
? s mimic : event ? e .
? e mimic : time ‘ ‘2682−09−12 20 : 00 : 00 −0500”.
? e mimic : v1 ?o .
? e mimic : v2 ?o2 .
FILTER( isNumeric (? o2 ) && isNumeric (? o ) ) .
}
Listing A.9: Test Query 9
PREFIX rd f : <http ://www.w3 . org /1999/02/22− rdf−syntax−ns#>
PREFIX rd f s : <http ://www.w3 . org /2000/01/ rdf−schema#>
PREFIX f o a f : <http :// xmlns . com/ f o a f /0.1#>
PREFIX mimic : <http :// a i r . c s a i l . mit . edu/ sp im onto l og i e s /mimicOntology#>
SELECT (%s (? o ) as ? aggr ) WHERE{
? s f o a f : name ?n .
? s mimic : event ? e .
? e mimic :m1 ‘ ‘ I n s u l i n ” .
? e mimic : v1 ?o .
? e mimic : v2 ?o2 .
FILTER( isNumeric (? o ) ) .
FILTER(? o > 1)
}
Listing A.10: Test Query 10
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Appendix B
Full Results
The following are the full results for the test queries. Note that runtimes are given
in seconds.
Test Query 1 Results
Operation Query Time Sen Calculation Time Actual Sensitivity Calculated Sensitivity
COUNT 0.020976 0.05231 970 970
Test Query 2 Results
Operation Query Time Sen Calculation Time Actual Sensitivity Calculated Sensitivity
COUNT 0.015823126 0.011798859 229 229
SUM 0.010298967 0.01198101 869 869
AVG 0.019440889 0.044335127 0.1621 0.639
MAX 0.010645866 0.012124062 1 1
MIN 0.010524988 0.012120962 0 0
Test Query 3 Results
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Operation Query Time Sen Calculation Time Actual Sensitivity Calculated Sensitivity
COUNT 0.007927895 0.00800705 77 77
SUM 0.007529974 0.007997036 379 379
AVG 0.008255005 0.031481028 3.1747 9.3426
MAX 0.007451057 0.008117914 8 8
MIN 0.007512093 0.008100986 0 0
Test Query 4 Results
Operation Query Time Sen Calculation Time Actual Sensitivity Calculated Sensitivity
COUNT 0.01048708 0.012546062 204 204
SUM 0.01123786 0.012809038 861 861
AVG 0.010828972 0.047777891 0.09 1.031
MAX 0.01145792 0.01297307 1 1
MIN 0.011392117 0.012881041 0 0
Test Query 5 Results
Operation Query Time Sen Calculation Time Actual Sensitivity Calculated Sensitivity
COUNT 0.08081007 0.098078012 611 611
SUM 0.085678816 0.097680092 115108.7 115108.7
AVG 0.087270975 0.373119116 6.1632 13.38
MAX 0.084903955 0.097922087 450 450
MIN 0.083213806 0.098366022 0.07646 0.07646
Test Query 6 Results
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Operation Query Time Sen Calculation Time Actual Sensitivity Calculated Sensitivity
COUNT 0.136605978 0.153807878 967 967
SUM 0.139995098 0.155878067 115124.68 115124.68
AVG 0.139881134 0.616436958 6.319 8.338
MAX 0.148360014 0.160467148 450 450
MIN 0.144635916 0.158998966 0 0
Test Query 7 Results
Operation Query Time Sen Calculation Time Actual Sensitivity Calculated Sensitivity
COUNT 0.006100178 0.004678965 1 1
SUM 0.004260063 0.004747868 1350 1350
AVG 0.004283905 0.017117977 1350 1350
MAX 0.004103184 0.004703999 1350 1350
MIN 0.004188061 0.004717112 1350 1350
Test Query 8 Results
Operation Query Time Sen Calculation Time Actual Sensitivity Calculated Sensitivity
COUNT 0.002182961 0.002643108 0 0
SUM 0.002092123 0.002592087 0 0
AVG 0.002075911 0.002662182 0 0
MAX 0.00207901 0.002576113 0 0
MIN 0.002048969 0.002597094 0 0
Test Query 9 Results
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Operation Query Time Sen Calculation Time Actual Sensitivity Calculated Sensitivity
COUNT 0.004920959 0.010298014 1.414 1.414
SUM 0.004822016 0.010312796 1350 1350
AVG 0.004909992 0.024574041 1350 1350
MAX 0.004843235 0.01032114 1350 1350
MIN 0.004893064 0.010319948 1350 1350
Test Query 10 Results
Operation Query Time Sen Calculation Time Actual Sensitivity Calculated Sensitivity
COUNT 0.012365818 0.014447212 204 204
SUM 0.013066053 0.014631987 861 861
AVG 0.013166904 0.056000948 0.09 1.03125
MAX 0.013354063 0.014893055 1 1
MIN 0.013329029 0.014914989 0 0
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